This interview concerns the premise of 'aesthetics' , as a certain regime of identi cation, which intervenes within the domain of 'politics' and 'history of art' , as con gured in the ideations of Jacques Rancière. From this general premise the discussion provokes us to particularly re-con gure the concept of 'modernism' in art that is not solely de ned through simplistic comparisons with 'post-modernism' . Instead, a re-con guration of 'modernism' lets us reconsider the 'Avant Garde' project from the methodology of an 'aesthetic community' formulated during the French revolution existing still in the texts of the young Marx of the 1840s. The logic of representations in art moves beyond the objective structures of 'Dialectical Reason' , and instead gets aligned to the aesthetic logic of being spatio-temporally 'surplus' . Furthermore, it is the aesthetic logic that introduces the heterogeneity of political symbolizations that underlines a multiplicity of process as against a distinct strategy linking theory and practice thus even challenging a global rationality of de ning 'what is art?' (Art History) and 'what is politics?' (Politics). It is based upon these contingent reversals of the signi cation of the world, of trying to identify the singular points of disruptions connecting to or not connecting to make a whole, that the interview concludes with questions on the multiplicity of possibles.
restore "outside" objects. This "outside" is the domain of appearance not as form but as the experience of content. Such an experience is nothing but the consciousness that connects art to real transformations in life. Rather, autonomy of art replaces any concepts of conscious experience with the processes of the medium and form: a novel about the novel, a painting about painting.
Autonomy, as the operation of the self-constrained artistic system that implodes the artwork, lends it depth. There is only one destination: nowhere. However, this path to nowhere is the path of intellect. Intellect is the absolute. The connoisseur gets drawn to the artwork's beyond side, thus imbibed away from living. Evoking the stylistics of the Byzantium sojourn, one may conclude there is no country for old connoisseurs. The sensual music neglects old connoisseurs but the monument, as the monument of intellect, stands rm for them. Intellect decides, when Greenberg elevates a Picasso to a higher level than a Ripkin. Ripkin's realism hides the technique. As such, the content is laid bare to experience immediately, on the surface. Such a sur cial mediation does not require a higher re ection of the intellect. This experience is of an immediate recognition that conjoins art and life. Because there is no discontinuity between art and life, the selfcontainment of the autonomous absolute is disrupted. On the contrary, Picasso's abstraction keeps the medium speci city of the artistic system intact. The system attains autonomy because it lets one derive ultimate values from art at a second remove -a second remove that nds a path beyond the immediate experience towards the intellectual absolute, the realm of the higher re ection of the connoisseurs.
The autonomy of the intellectual absolute replicates the autonomy of the Hegelian "scienti c knowledge" of the arts. In Hegel, knowledge determines the object of art through a formal constitution within the original restriction of the ever-evolving absolute form-totality. The science of totality cancels the immediacy of the object through a determination of historical phases, i.e., from whence the object is derived and towards what it progresses. Such a historicity of the object gets intertwined with the genealogy of the "lonely" artists of the avant-garde in Greenberg. Autonomous historicity of forms is the determination of appearance to the absolute annihilation of content. At stake here is the intellectual audacity to be an intellectual without life. The monument perhaps would be more magni cent in its autonomy without a Yeats. We arrive nowhere.
II
The second path is the path of the aesthetic regime of the arts, in other words, of the politics of aesthetics. Artistic autonomy considered aesthetics only as a relative value in the domain of experience. As such aesthetics had to give away to absolute form. But a fundamental problem remains with autonomy: the problem of choice. Either Ripkin or Picasso. The choice is based on the historicity of the artistic constitution of the object, i.e., modernity, and ignores what is constituted, i.e., the object and its experience. There is no freedom in this choice. The arbitrary choice of form has an insuf cient program because the form itself is both the immediate and the original. As a result, historicity is the sole condition that exists to the irrelevance of the particular object.
This irrelevance of the object, in turn, takes us to Adorno's critique of Sartre's dramas, dramas constructed through the necessity of choice of the characters. Adorno is concerned with the unfreedom of characters because of the fact that within the immediacy of an original choice the content remains intact as a predetermined reality.
The critique is both subjective and objective. The characters are not subjective because their choice keeps the ground of the administered world unaltered. The characters are not objective because they cannot divest themselves from their enclosed subjectivity to become a subject that registers the particular object in history. What I draw from this critique, where the subject should register the object to become subjectively objective, is the annihilation of the necessity of historicity of the object. The object is no longer stuck within the cyclical loop of the Hegelian "scienti c knowledge. " Ontologically speaking, being subjectively objective is the absence of Hegelian totality. It is never-neither the realist Ripkin or the modernist Picasso. Neither does a Rembrandt anticipate a Picasso.
Rather, the object that was totally intellectualized in autonomy is available again to the domain of experience without completely foregoing the effective objectivity of forms. The object frees itself from the oppression of forms. Experience and knowledge coexist in an indeterminate state of balance, a path to nowhere. A state that Schiller calls aesthetics, a state of being, which is the springboard to Rancière's politics of aesthetics and is fundamental to our title, disruptions. Disruptions might be considered as the original ground of historicity constructed through unfree choices, a trope central to politics of aesthetics.
Aesthetics as a state of being, as Schiller de nes it, is the active determination of a free situation located at a medium position. This free medium position contains an irreconcilable mutual negation, i.e., where both the sensation of content and the intellect of form is negated. Af rmation through negation, is the active determination of appearance where it does not have to suffer the torture of form or the promiscuity of content. Such is the state of the free in appearance. Rancière's system, if politics of aesthetics can be called a system at all, puts this state of the free at its centre. Aesthetics as con gured by Rancière does not deal with art per se.
Rather, politics of aesthetics, if it deals with art at all, treats aesthetics as a speci c experience of pure art that leads to the self-suppression of art. As a result of this selfsuppression art gets translated to life whereby aesthetics gets translated to aestheticopolitics. What gets disrupted is the separation of art and life that autonomous art promises. The tactic of disrupting the separation is a tactic of "aestheticization of common existence. " Now, what is this aestheticization of common existence?
We start from the indistinctions of form and content innate to the free state. The indistinctions of the aesthetic state operate through Rancière's insistence on Schiller's Spieltrieb (play drive). The Spieltriebis the medium of translation enabled by aesthetics that disrupts the self-containment of art and conjugates it with life. The translation that reconstructs thus the edi ce of both art and life is aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic experience transforms the historicity of the object as in modernity through the experience of an and. The and is the conjugation between autonomous art andits simultaneous grounding in life anticipating real transformations. Suspension of both the form and content in the medium position of balance is the experience of indeterminate indistinctions in appearance. The object emerges beyond any determination by knowledge, i.e., beyond any scope of reversal to the absolute as in autonomy. The ground of historicity that modernity bases itself upon crumbles.
What emerges in such experience directly affects common existence in everyday life.
Aesthetic experience, as a domain of affect, disrupts modernity primarily by destabilizing its structures of judgment. These structures of judgment de ne themselves by articulating one's appraisal of the object through concepts. This disarticulation in appraising inherent to aesthetic experience reconstitutes the object in a regime of indistinctions. Crucial here are these two expressions-rst, the regime of indistinctions innate to aesthetic experience, and second, the mode of being affected by aesthetic experience.
With regard to the regime of indistinctions innate to aesthetic experience, we shall take a Deleuzean detour to reach the Rancièrian position. Indistinctions in Deleuze is a 21 22 condition of engaging with the world where being cannot refer to any model of legislation, i.e., cannot choose any preference. It is a world in process, an archipelago. Islands can never constitute a whole but are parts in a wall of uncemented stones oating in isolation and having a value in itself yet in relation to others. The Deleuzean indistinctions thwart any reconciliation of the islands/parts to land/pure form because "truth has always had jagged edges. " Rancière both agrees and disagrees with Deleuze. For Rancière, indistinctions in aesthetic experience operate until such indistinctions constitute objects in the domain of lived experiences debunking life as a transcendental eld. What is meant by life as a transcendental eld is the condition of life that does not refer to either a subject or an object but rather is the stream of an a-subjective consciousness, i.e., a prere exive impersonal consciousness without a self. The life condition that Deleuze proposes is the condition of being that does not enable a transcendence of the form of wounds as a higher actuality. Rather wounds exist always within the milieu of experience.
We reach an agreement between Deleuze and Rancière. Disagreement begins when condition is the condition of anonymity, i.e., a life without qualities. A bare condition of life, that Rancière calls "deprived life, " is a condition to which all human responsibilities are disallowed. This is a life without personality. Such is the surplus condition of life without personality/form that lays bare the zone of indistinctions as opposed to any constitution within the "Rights of Man. "
The subject's quest for a personality in the context of these rights and the subject position inherent to it takes the subject also to a path that leads nowhere. The mode of being tries to approach form, by determining the object, with the aim of staking a claim within the "Rights of Man. " But in the Rancièrian politics of aesthetics such a determination becomes impossible The mode of being can never constitute the object purely within the region of human rights. The pure region of human rights becomes a region of the already administered object. This administration is the administration that Foucault, in "Omnes et Singulatim, " develops as the theory of police. The police regime of state is its pastoral character, where the state departs from its ideological foundations, and becomes the shepherd exercising sheer control over life and bodies of the ock. For Rancière even human rights, or the forms of philanthropy built on the ground of the "Rights of Man, " become a designation of the police to the extent that police does not refer to any institution but rather designates a management of lives, objects, and spaces, i.e., the management of the distribution of the sensible.
A return of the mode of being to the sensible is a return to experience at the cost of pure rationality. Politics of aesthetics as an experience is a mode of being that constitutes the object as a mode that obstructs the Hegelian personality of the object always geared towards a reconciliation in absolute knowledge. The mode here is precisely that lacuna that Hegel faced with the Spinozist mode. In Spinoza, as Macherey notes, the object is substance in indistinctions, i.e., without a measure of its difference to other objects and therefore lacking the individuality of the Hegelian being-in-itself/particular. Macherey further elaborates that unlike the Hegelian absolute where the object as being-in-itself is reconciled in absolute knowledge, the absolute in Spinoza is the interplay of a triad. This triad is the constitution of the development of the object: rst, a substantial identity of the object completely withdrawn into itself; second, the external manifestation of object con rming the initial af rmation of substantial identity through a re ection in its attributes; third, the singular disposition of a passage whereby the attribute of the object attains the status of a mode re ecting the absolute process. The object is constituted as substance. If we follow Macherey's study we might conclude that instead of the reconciliation of the object as knowledge as in Hegel, in Spinoza it decomposes to a nowhere. Aesthetic experience in the Rancièrian politics of aesthetics is the experience of such a passage to nowhere in appearance. The Rancièrian mode of being reconstitutes the object in the effective differences of singularities but simultaneously these singular reconstitutions are without measure, wherefore their affective potential. To go back to the monument in Byzantium, one might conclude then that the monument urgently requires the poet. Its magni cence is that each poet adorns it with new stones that are different but are so in their indistinctions. We arrive nowhere. It is a notion that means something to the extent that you agree with the idea of modernity and modernism that it presupposes. I argue that postmodernism is a concept entirely predicated on a kind of self-de nition of modernity. To be short, I would say there are probably two levels in the de nition of modernism and modernity. There is the concept of modernism that was elaborated around the 1940s by Clement Greenberg more or less in agreement with the thinking of the Frankfurt School that the idea of modernity in art means the autonomy of art which now deals with its own material, its own procedures, no more representations, etc. Post-modernism was a response to that de nition of modernity in art, but that de nition is really a joke. If modernism means something in art and if avant-garde means something in art it does not mean that art now deals with its own practice, medium, and material. It means exactly the contrary: a certain idea of the conjunction of art and life. There is a second level. If we refuse this very simplistic notion of modernity and modernism, you have to consider what probably can be de ned as a historical avant-garde project, which was a project of connection between art and life, based on the idea that art is able to create a new fabric of common life. This is linked with the historical experience of the revolutionary avant-garde in Soviet Union. But there is also the German avant-garde, Bauhaus let us say, crystallizing the experience of the rst thirty years of the twentieth century. At this level you de ne a very different idea of what modernism and modernity is.
Simultaneously, there is a simplistic idea of this "avant-garde" project, that there was a faith in history, that there was a great dream of Western thinking to recreate the world and very often this is assimilated to the project of emancipation in general. There is often this kind of identi cation of the idea of the modernist project as a kind of global and historical faith in the development of history: the idea that the historical process will produce by itself a kind of global transformation of all political, social structures and the avant-garde project is thought as part of this big dream of Western reason. Things are much more complicated. There are at least two elements. First, at the moment of the French revolution there is idea of an "aesthetic community" which goes through the work of Schiller, Hölderlin, the young Hegel, the young Schelling. There was the idea that true revolution is not simply a revolution in the structures of power, in the law, in the state, but a revolution of the practical way of inhabiting the world. There was the idea of a revolution in the modes of being, perceiving, and doing. Then this project of a true sensible revolution was incorporated into the project of social emancipation. Think of the texts of young Marx in the 1840s when he opposes the human revolution to the political revolution which comes directly from this big project at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. There was this project of a revolution of the sensible that would be something stronger and more important than the political revolution. 38 39 Second, if an avant-garde project, if an aesthetic modernity means something, it means something in this context. There is also a third point about the very idea of avant-garde.
There is a simplistic idea of the avant-garde of the proletariat, of those who have the Marxist science or those who are able to lead the masses with the light of science. Also, there is the idea of the avant-garde of the young who want to adhere to modernity, to electricity, to steel, iron, concrete, speed, etc. This idea of the avant-garde is associated with people implementing some kind of futurist project, like the futurist manifesto of Marinetti in the 1910s. So there is the idea of avant-garde as people fascinated with electricity, with cars, with speed, with machines, etc. I think these two visions, which are of the avant-garde as the people leading the cattle and the avant-garde as the futurists fascinated with the new technology are very simplistic. What is important is that the idea of the avant-garde is not so much of people going forward as much as it is the idea of people trying to deal with the contradiction of temporalities.
In my book Aisthesis, I commented on Emerson's "The Poet" from the 1840s which ideates that America is in a chaos. It is a chaos because at the same time you have economic modernity, industrial modernity, etc., but there is no common thread giving some kind of unity to this movement. The idea that modernity is divided because there are lot of new things in the domain of material production, in the domain of economy, but there is no new form of being together. This is probably the true idea of the avant-garde.
Not the idea that you go forward, but the idea that you are living in a time which is a time of con icting times. The young Marx of the 1840s says in his texts on Hegel's "Theory of to whether the image is determined by the medium. I tried to say that the status of the 41 image, as an operation, is not determined by the medium. There was, at that moment, a discussion opposing cinema to television, saying that cinema produces image which are witnesses of alterity while in the television the image comes from the box, i.e., the image is just the effect of the box. I objected that you can de ne the image independently from the surface on which the image appears. In Au Hasard Balthazar, the images of Bresson must be rst de ned as operations and those operations are the same whether you see Bresson's lm in a movie theater or whether you see it on the screen of the television. Of course the quality of the image is not the same, what you perceive is not the same but the operation that creates the image is the same. The cinematographic image is not the image of what has been in front of the lmmaker, for instance, at the beginning of Au Hazard Balthazar, a little girl, a little boy, and a donkey. The image is a certain set of operations which makes you expect something and something else appear on the screen and thereby you have a dissensus. The artistic image consists in making a form of connection between the words and the visible, between a shot and the following which runs different from the normal interconnection. Consensus means that you can reasonably predict the next image. This is often the case with television, but it is not an effect of the technical dispositif. It is the effect of the social dispositif within which it works. Instead, the image made by Bresson is an operation, a set of relation between a shot and an overshot between the sound and a lot of operations. The artistic image is always in a form of disjunction or a form of dissociation. This for me is different from the questions of crossmediality or inter-mediality. I don't de ne the image by the crossing of several media. I de ne it by a disjunction that can perfectly operate within one single medium, because (it may be the contrary) the disjunctions mean that you cannot de ne the nature of an image from simply the medium that produces it.
DC: What could be the possible relation between cross-mediality or inter-mediality and the aesthetic regime of the arts? Might one consider the operations of aesthetic regime through crossovers across artistic media? In this context of crossovers might we regard your analyses, for example, of Au Hasard Balthassar, in which you refer to a certain fragmentation and the way this fragmentation become a site for reducing an action to its essence? Does this fragmentation proliferate references to cross-medial or inter
It is true that I also question this modernist idea that an art is de ned by its speci c medium, by its speci c relation to its own medium. If modernity means something in art, it means a certain form of disruption of the normal distribution of the medium, of the normal use of the medium. This is what I tried also to say about typography, about the way in which the page of the book could be thought no more simply as the white surface on which text is printed but as having a certain form of autonomy or a certain form of interrelation with other pages which is not a matter of textual relation but a relation with the space. I discussed it about the case of Stephan Mallarmé. Mallarmé is supposed to be a poet emblematic of modernity as medium speci city. It is actually the contrary. He conceives of the problem in a way such that the problem is not simply textual, but rather concerns spatial distributions so that two pages of the book can become like a theater. A stage, that lets you imagine the relation of the letters and words on the page as a choreographic relation. I insisted that Mallarmé was inspired by dances, musicals, etc. He tried to rethink poetry by imagining some kind of writing in space which was more or less inspired by forms of dance and performance in theaters and musicals. It is very important for me in the history of modernist art or avant-gardist art to chalk out this attempt to go through different media and to create new forms of sensory fabric by mixing different mediums and the laws of different mediums. Putting together poetry and dance or perhaps choreography and lm, theater and circus, etc. They all are history of the really high moment of modernism in art, when there were attempts to create new forms of time, space, and performance blending coming from different arts. From poetry, from painting, from theater, from dance, from gymnastic, from sports.
The problem with the idea of cross-mediality is that it implies that you have technical tools to create cross-medialities. But the crossing is aesthetic before being technical. In the case of a video-installation, the television monitor at the same time can play the role of a sculpture de ned by the volume that it occupies in the space and the role of the at surface on which you see mobile images. It is an example among many examples. You can create all kinds of mixing of image, of video, of sculpture, of music, of performance, etc. If you think of the high moment of the modernist project it was not possible for this kind of cross-mediality to exist. There were no computers, no video, sound systems, etc. When Mallarmé tried to create the page as a theatrical stage he had none of our technical means. Now [it] is quite easy. You see it in computer works, video works when effectively the page starts transforming itself in a lm, dance, etc. He had not the technical tools, but he had the aesthetic program. What interests me is this kind of anticipation-that the aesthetic of cross-mediality exists before the technological means. This is very important for me. There was this big argument everywhere that art is transformed by new technology accompanied by a simplistic reading of Benjamin about the mechanical arts. I tried to question these simplistic ideas that new technologies create new forms of art.
Cinema and photography do not simply become art as a consequence of technology because the technology has existed long ago before photography and lm were recognized as art. Being included in the sphere of art presupposes a certain aesthetic. The aesthetic is not the simple consequence of the technological but rather it exists before the technological. Photography could become an art when it stopped trying to be artistic by a lot of procedures and instead adopted the realistic aesthetic that was created in the novel, the idea that you can create beauty with the everyday, with the mundane. There was a long time during which photography tried to create some kind of fantastic atmosphere by a lot of technical artefacts, which did not work. It worked when photography decided to show cars in the street, chimneys of factories and boats, the spectacle of the street, etc.
Thus, cross-mediality becomes part of the same logic, meaning that the aesthetic of cross- independent from each other. The problem with so many theories on revolution is that they always try to think of itself as the distinct process with the idea that there is a strategy and there is an uprising and after that there is the result. It never works. The point is not let us say theory against eclecticism. It is the reality of the multiplicity of processes against the idea of a clear cut deduction of causes and effects coming from a strategy. You have always the same kind of discourse where ever you have a movement.
There are always those people saying that there is no strategy, no program, so this is just shit. But movements always came rst and movements always were heterogeneous. JR: I can't really know. For me the present and perhaps the future is more about heterogeneity. The idea pertaining to modernity in art elaborated around the 1930s or 1940s, insisted that the destiny of art was abstraction. According to this logic (if you think of Clement Greenberg) there was this idea that old painting was representation and new painting is abstraction. And it was totally wrong. This means that abstraction was part of something much more global, much more complicated that could produce things entirely different. What for me characterizes the aesthetic regime is the possibility of multiplicity of things. It is in fact really the withdrawal of any principle of global legitimacy which becomes very important. If you think about painting there was a time when it was possible to say this was a good painting for this or that reason. Within the aesthetic logic there is no such possibility. There are some technical procedures that try to implement certain ideas to create some kind of space, some kind of sensorium and people really relate themselves to that sensorium but no more with this idea that "it is beautiful because of this or that. " It is not my decision but I think we really live in a multiplicity of possibles.
There are certain forms that are dominant at certain moments; it can be abstract painting, it can be installation. But basically what we are looking at now are a multiplicity of things.
One of the performances of the Venice Biennale in 2015 was the reading of Marx's Capital. During the six months of the Venice Biennale, there were people reading entirely the Capital. The reading of the Capital is an artistic performance alongside with the multiplicity of other artistic performances. Therefore, the idea of performance can now can include anything. It can include the reading of a book, as well as the construction of a space. I do not think now you can say either the future is the surface or future is the destruction of the surface though we are at a time when perhaps those distinctions are not working. The space of art is not the global construction according to judgment of value. The global con guration of the space is more important than what is in that space.
In the space you can have videos, screenings, paintings, living performance. It is the whole space which is now the work of art. There is this kind of reconstruction of space and of course it is still more obvious because so many art spaces now are disused factories and arsenals, etc. Art is made by the con guration of space more than it is made by the collection of artworks in those spaces.
